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Abstract
Cournot dynamical game is studied on a graph. The stability of the
system is studied. Prisoner’s dilemma game is used to model natural
gas transmission.
Key words: Dynamical Cournot game, graph; gas, water and elec-
tricity transportation.
1 Introduction
Game theory [1] was first introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern in
1944 as a mathematical model. It is the study of ways in which strategic
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interactions among rational players produce outcomes with respect to the
preferences of the players. Each player in a game faces a choice among two
or more possible strategies. A strategy is a predetermined program of play
that tells thei player which action to take in response to every possible strat-
egy other players may use . Transportation of natural gas electricity and
water allocation for different purposes was studied recently by Ilkihc [2]. He
modeled it as static Cournot game on a graph. We study the dynamic game.
The dynamic equations are derived. The stability of the equilibrium solution
is studied. Prisoner’s dilemma game is used to model the source countries-
transit countries- markets interaction on a graph.The problem studied in this
letter can be explained by the following example: Assume Russia wants to
export gas to two EU countries say EU1, EU2. Assume Azerbaijan wants
to export gas to EU2 only. Thus Cournot game exists between Russia and
Azerbaijan in EU2. The Russian gas pipelines pass through Belarus hence
prisoner’s dilemma game (PD) exists between Russia and Belarus. Simi-
larly Azeri gas pipelines pass through Turkey hence PD game exists between
Azerbaijan and Turkey.
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2 A Cournot dynamic game on a graph
Transportation of natural gas electricity and water allocation for different
purposes is an important problem. However most of its studies are static
while the problem is dynamic. The vertices of the graph representing the
problem are pf three types markets mi, i = 1, 2, ..., k1 firms (producers)
fj , j = 1, 2, ..., k2 and transit countries through which the lines pass. The
profit function of firm fj is given by
Πj =
∑
i
αiqij − γjs
2
j/2−
∑
i
βiqijci (1)
sj =
∑
l
qlj , ci =
∑
l
qil (2)
where qij are the production quantity from firm j to market i and αi, βi, γj
are positive constants. The sum over i is on all markets connected to firm j.
Conversely the sum in ci is over all firms supplying market i.
The dynamic Cournot game with bounded rationality is given by [3,4]
dqij/dt = bj(∂Πj/∂qij) (3)
The parameters bj are proportionality parameters. They may be taken
as functions of the production quantities but here we will take them as con-
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stants.
For general graph Cournot bounded rationality game the dynamic equa-
tions are
dqij/dt = bj [αi − γj
∑
l
qlj − βiqij − βi
∑
k
qik] (4)
Here we will consider a simple graph consisting of two firms and two
markets. The first firm supplies both markets while second firm supply only
second market. In this case the above system takes the form
dq11/dt = α1 − γ1(q11 + q21)− 2β1q11 (5)
dq21/dt = α2 − γ1(q11 + q21)− β2(2q21 + q22)
dq22/dt = α2 − γ2q22 − β2(2q22 + q21)
after rescaling the system becomes:
dq11/dt = 1− r1q11 − q21 (6)
dq22/dt = 1− r2q22 − q21
dq21/dt = 1− r3q21 − r4q11 − r5q22
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Applying Routh-Hurwitz conditions [5] the unique equilibrium of the
above system is locally asymptotically stable if the following conditions are
satisfied:
a1 > 0, a3 > 0, a1a2 > a3 (7)
a1 = r1 + r2 + r3
a2 = r1r2 + r1r3 + r2r3 − r4 − r5
a3 = r1r2r3 − r1r4 − r2r5
For the special case r1 = r2the above results simplifies significantly. The
unique equilibrium solution become
q11 = q22 = (1− q21)/r1 (8)
q21 = (r1 − r4 − r5)/(r1r3 − r4 − r5)
The existence and stability conditions are
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r1 > r4 + r5 (9)
r3 > 1
The approximate solutions for system (6):
If we take q11(0) = 0.1, q22(0) = 0.2, q21(0) = 0.3, r1 = 0.01, r2 = 0.1, r3 =
1.1, r4 = −0.3,and r5 = 0.4.
We find that the interior equilibrium point is unstable where the condi-
tions (2.7) is not satisfied.
If we take q11(0) = 0.1, q22(0) = 0.2, q21(0) = 0.3, r1 = 0.2, r2 = 0.5, r3 =
1.5, r4 = −0.3,and r5 = 0.4.
We find that the interior equilibrium point (1.13636, 0.454545, 0.772727)
is locally asymptotically stable where the conditions (2.7) is satisfied.
3 Cooperation on graphs
In natural gas, electricity and water transport a new situation exists namely
transit countries. Those where transmission lines pass e.g. Belarus in the
line Russia-Belarus- EU gas line. In this case a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
game [6] exists between both producers and end users from one side and
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transit countries on the other. In PD game there are two strategies namely
to cooperate or to defect. Typically the payoff matrix for such a game is
given by


R S
T U

 , T > R > U > S (10)
The standard dominant strategy is to defect hence both sides lose a
lot. A way to solve this problems is through side payments paid by both
producers and end users to transit countries.
Games on graphs has been studied by May and Sigmund [7]. They have
shown that in the case of Prisoner’s dilemma game cooperation can exist
easier than the standard game.
4 Conclusions
Dynamical games representing natural gas, electricity and water are studied
using Cournot game on a graph. Stability of the unique equilibrium solution
is investigated. Prisoner’s dilemma game is used to model the producers-
transit countries-end users interactions. The existence of graphs will improve
the possibility of cooperation between these countries.
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